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Abstract
This paper uses national survey data to estimate up-to-date private rates of return to education in
Burkina Faso. Mincer earning regressions are fitted to wage data for women and men, and for public
and private sector workers. The main results indicate that rates of return rise by level of education,
and the public sector does not compensate female primary education. The findings suggest that
current education polices which focus on increasing primary schooling supply be complemented
with support for children, especially girls from resource constrained households to reach the
secondary and tertiary levels. The estimated returns to education are strongly influenced by sample
selection. For both men and women, failing to control for both selection in the wage sector and
sector choice leads to biased estimates based on my identification of the selection process.
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1 Introduction
Schooling levels in Burkina have been historically low with total years of schooling averaging about
0.6 years for men aged 50-54 and 2.6 years among the youngest cohort (Schultz, 2003). Women
in the same cohorts received about half of the male schooling level, suggesting a persistent gender
gap. For children aged between 7 and 15 years, average enrollment rate is about 31 percent in 1998,
with wide disparities between boys and girls, and between rural and urban areas (e.g. UNESCO,
2001; National surveys 1998). Although observed school enrollment rates are related to a number
of factors under and beyond the household's control, one can argue that private rate of return to
education is one of the key contributing factors. Thus, returns to education are useful for designing
education policies.
Previous estimates of returns to education in Burkina have used data which may not have
been nationally representative. The estimations by Ram and Singh (1988), which are subsequently
reported by Psacharopoulos (Psacharopoulos, 1994), use a sample of 60 rural households surveyed
in 1980. The private returns to education are estimated at 9.6 percent. Using a 1982 survey,
Psacharopoulos (Psacharopoulos, 1985, 1994) report social rate of returns to education of 20 percent
for primary education, 14.9 percent for secondary education and 21.3 percent at the university. To
the extent that the samples used were not representative of the entire population, and rates of
return to education may be changing over time, the reported rates of return to education may be
misleading and of little relevance to policy formulation.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate private returns to education in Burkina Faso, in order
to learn whether low returns to education contribute to explain the observed enrollment rates.
In connection with the current national education policy which focuses on increasing the supply
of primary education services (Ministere de l' Economie et des Finances, 2001), the exercise can
generate two main policy implications. First, if rates of returns to education are e®ectively low on
average and households perceive education as investment in their children, enrollment is unlikely
to increase as a response to increased supply of education services. Second, if rates of returns
are increasing with education level, low income households who lack the resources to support3
their children to reach higher education levels may not ever enroll them. This is because these
households will then face the low segment of the rate of returns. Furthermore, a wide gap in
returns to education between men and women will imply that parents are willing to invest more
in male than in female education. In either case, increasing the supply of schooling services at the
primary level, might not be su±cient to increase school enrollment, especially for poor families and
girls in these families, who are the main target of these policies. This paper makes two empirical
contribution to the literature on returns to education. Firs, it provides more reliable estimates
of rates of return to education for Burkina Faso, a country with low school attendance even by
African standards and yet with rare estimates of return to education. Second, the paper attempts
to distinguish between the public and the private sectors, an issue which has received less attention
by the empirical literature dealing with returns to education in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.
In this paper, education is treated as a private decision to invest in human capital and the
internal rate of return to that private investment is estimated. This approach has been used
extensively to examine returns to education in both developed and developing countries1. If there
is strong evidence indicating that private returns to education are large relative to other investments
with similar degrees of risk, then the observed low enrollment rates might be explained by some
market failures, which prevent individuals from implementing their privately optimal education
investment plans. Such ¯ndings may justify public interventions (Schultz, 2003).
The paper uses the 1994 and 1998 waves of the priority survey ( PS I and II ) conducted by
the national statistical agency. The private rates of returns to education are estimated as the
coe±cients on years of education variables in the logarithmic wage equation that contains controls
for post-schooling potential work experience and other individual characteristics (Mincer, 1974).
Sample selection bias is controlled in two steps. First, the decision whether to participate in the
wage sector is taken into account by using the selection correction approach proposed by Heckman
(1979). Second, the Heckman approach is generalized into a two stage selection process, in an
attempt to control simultaneously for both self-selection into the wage sector and endogenous
choice between the private and the public sectors following an approach proposed by Tunali (1986).
1See Schultz (1988) for a review in developing countries.4
Robustness of the estimates is checked using semi-parametric methods. The analysis is limited
to the wage sector, and therefore does not cover the urban self-employed and most agricultural
workers. The main reason for excluding self-employed is because earnings data from this sector
also incorporate returns to physical capital and to risk borne by individuals, which are di±cult to
disentangle from returns to education in the absence of speci¯c information.
The central ¯ndings are summarized as follows. Without controlling for choice between private
and public sectors, the average gross private returns to education in Burkina are about 9 percent
for primary education for men and women, 16.4 percent for women and 14.3 percent for men at the
secondary level, and 18.1 percent for women and 23.4 percent for men at the university level. The
results are sensitive to controlling for endogenous choice between private and public sectors. After
controlling for sector choice, the rate of returns to primary education is almost zero for women.
This suggests that based on private wage returns calculations, fewer girls have an incentive to be
enrolled than boys, unless the education policy increases girl expectations for reaching g the higher
segments of the education system, or the employment prospects for females with primary education
improve.
The second section discusses the data and the sample used for estimations. The third section
reviews the econometric speci¯cations. The fourth section discusses the results. The ¯fth section
concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
The paper uses data from the two rounds of the Priority Survey (PS), conducted in 1994 and in
1998. The two surveys are similar in the scope of the information collected, the sampling design and
the coverage. The number of households interviewed is 8642 in 1994 and 8478 in 1998. Information
was collected on household and individual characteristics, employment status and wage received.
The analysis in this paper concerns the working age population, de¯ned to include individuals
aged between 15 and 65. The resulting sample for the two years contains 55526 working age
individuals, from whom 6.4 percent were wage earners. Monthly wages were calculated for those5
working in paid labor. Table (1) summarizes descriptive statistics of the variables used in the
regressions and selected others, education levels of the workforce is tabulated in table (2) and
allocation of the workforce between the private and the public sector is presented in table (3).
In table 1, the wage variable is the average monthly wage in CFA Franc expressed in log.
Education is measured as the total numbers of years of schooling, which is further decomposed
in primary, secondary and tertiary education. There is a maximum of six and seven years at the
primary and secondary levels, respectively. Because information on actual number of years spent at
the tertiary level was not available, an average of two years was allocated to individuals with some
post secondary education. This corresponds to half the time required to complete the bachelor
degree at the national university. The post schooling experience is obtained by subtracting years
of schooling and age at school entry from the individual current age. Because information on age
at school entry was not available, it is assumed that individuals started school at seven, which is
the o±cial school entry age in Burkina Faso.
|Insert table 1 about here|-
The average years of education completed is 1.4 for men and .54 years for women. Female wage
earners have completed on average 8.86 years of education as compared to 4.05 years for male wage
earners. This suggests that education increases women productivity in the wage sector more than it
does for men. Moreover, this is suggestive evidence that women working in the wage sector consist
of a selected sample, which is not representative of the female population. Finally, one notes that
working women have relatively less post schooling potential experience than men. This pattern can
be explained by women's relatively higher education attainment, and by younger cohorts of women
entering the wage market. It is apparent from table 2 that the private sector is the main provider of
wage job to individuals with no formal education, and to those with primary education, especially
to female workers. In contrast, less than 18 percent of men and less than 10 percent of women in
the public sector have the primary education level. This suggests that at least the completion of
primary school is increasingly the minimum requirement to compete for a public job.
|Insert table 2 about here|-
From table 3, the wage sector employs a very small fraction of the working age population.6
This small fraction of the labor force employed in the formal wage sector is typical for a developing
country and especially for sub-Saharan Africa2. The wage sector is dominated by male workers
and is concentrated in urban areas. In 1994, 82 percent of wage earners were male and 87 percent
resided in urban areas. In 1998, the corresponding ¯gures were 85 and 91 percent. Although the
wage sector remained stable ( 6.4 percent of the working population), this stability results from a
relative contraction of the public sector and an expansion of the private sector. The private sector
was employing 54.8 percent of the working population in 1998 compared to 46.4 percent in 1994.
This reallocation of workers between the two sectors may be attributed to the ongoing economic
reforms (Lienert and Modi, 1997).
|Insert table 3 about here|-
Figure 1 presents unconditional wage densities and distribution for four subgroups: male, female,
private sector and public sector workers. It is apparent from the ¯gure that wage distribution for
public sector workers is higher than that of private sector workers, while men wage is higher than
women wage for log wages less than 10.5. That is, unconditional wages for public servants appear
to be uniformly higher than those for private sector workers, while only low wage levels (less than
CFA 36000) do male worker wages exceed female workers wage.
|Insert ¯gure 1 about here|-
3 Econometric speci¯cations
Three speci¯cations are estimated based upon the Mincerian wage equation. The ¯rst speci¯cation
restricts the sample to wage earners and use ordinary least squares to estimate the wage equations.
The second speci¯cation controls for endogenous selection into the wage sector but, ignores selection
between private and public sectors. Finally, the third speci¯cation controls for selection in the wage
sector, and allows for endogenous choice between public and private sectors.
2For instance Lienert and Modi (1997) using data for 24 Sub-Saharan countries found that the central government
employ 1 percent of the population in 1996, and 0.6 percent in Burkina Faso.7
3.1 Base speci¯cation
The speci¯cation of the wage equations uses the human capital framework as developed by Becker (1975)
and Mincer (1958; 1974)3. Assuming that (i) the only costs of schooling are the forgone earnings
and (ii) each individual starts working after completion of school, Mincer (Mincer, 1958) shows that
the natural logarithm of wage can be expressed as a function of years of schooling, post schooling
experience and its quadratic term. Furthermore, this relationship provides direct measure for re-
turns to schooling through the coe±cients of years of schooling in the wage regression. The model
can be made more °exible by allowing the slope of the pro¯le to vary over di®erent segments of
education. In this paper, three levels of education are considered: the primary, the secondary and
the tertiary levels. This basic Mincerian wage equation is written as follows:
lnwi = ¯1x1i + ¯2x2i + "i (1)
Where x1i is a set of variables including the number of years of schooling in each education
level, post schooling experience and post schooling experience squared. This simple speci¯cation
implies a number of simplifying assumptions (Mwabu and Schultz, 2000)4. In this paper, the basic
Mincer's wage equation is augmented with three variables summarized by xi2. First, a year dummy
for 1994 is included to allow for the wage level to change between survey years. The second variable
is a residential dummy (rural versus urban), which is intended to control for the wage di®erential
between urban and rural areas. Although one expects a priori wages to be lower in rural areas, it
might not necessarily be so, since workers relocation to rural areas is usually associated with some
monetary compensation. Since 1991, the Burkinabe economy is being reformed, with potentially
di®erent e®ects on the wage market between rural and urban areas. To account for these potential
di®erent e®ects, the time and the geographic location dummies are interacted5.
3The Mincer earning equation is motivated by two conceptually di®erent frameworks which generate similar
estimable functional forms. The ¯rst model (Mincer, 1958) is based upon the principle of compensating di®erences,
and the second model (Mincer, 1974) builds on an accounting identity developed by (Becker, 1975). See Heckman,
Lochner, and Todd (2003) for a review.
4Speci¯cally, all individuals are assumed to have the same access to credit, (ii) correlations between genetic
endowment and human capital are assumed to be zero, education is assumed to be measured without errors.
5Note that when using the pooled sample, a gender dummy is also included.8
3.2 Sample selection
In estimating equation (1), the sample was restricted to wage earners. To the extent that this
speci¯c sub-sample is not representative of the entire working age population, the estimates may
be biased. There are at least two indications why sample selection may be a concern. First, only a
very small proportion of the working wage population is involved in the wage sector. Second, from
the descriptive statistics, it appears that women working in the wage sector and the non-working
women di®er substantially in their education attainment (8.9 years as compared to .55 years) as
well for men (6.4 years as compared to 1.4 years). Thus, I attempt to correct for potential selection
bias that may a®ect the OLS estimates, using Heckman approach (Heckman, 1979).
To implement Heckman's sample correction procedure, I specify a participation equation as
follows:
yi = ®1xi + ®2z1i + ¹i (2)
Where y is the participation decision, which is 1 if an individual is observed in the labor market,
and 0 otherwise, xi is a set of variables including both x1i and x2i, and z1 is a set of variables that
are believed to in°uence the participation decision through the reservation wage, without a direct
e®ect on the market wage received. Assuming joint normality of ¹i and "i, the joint maximum
likelihood estimates of (1) and (2) are consistent and e±cient (Greene, 1980).
Identi¯cation of equations (1) and (2) is achieved here via the use of restriction exclusions
analogous to those used in the standard IV approach (Wooldridge, 2002). A valid instrument in
the context of this paper, z, must be a determinant of the decision to join the wage sector and
have no direct in°uence on the wage o®ered or accepted. There are three identifying instruments.
The ¯rst instrument is household asset, approximated by ownership of real estate. The second
instrument is constructed around private business ownership. For families with private business, I
use the positive di®erence between the potential working experience and the business age. Thus,
it is unlikely that income received from the wage sector has been used to start the business. The
strategy could reduce potential reverse causality which may occur if wage workers use their earnings9
to start a business. The third instrument is the demand for labor by the private sector, which is
measured as the percentage of individuals reporting \employer" in each province as their main
occupation6. The ¯rst two instruments are supposed to determine individual reservation wage, and
the third instrument is supposed to lower search costs and improve competitiveness of private job
options. Assuming that neither of these variables a®ect wage market productivity, they may be
excluded from the wage equation.
3.3 Selection between private and public wage sectors
A potential concern when the estimation is restricted to equations (1) and (2) is that one ignores
potential di®erences of returns to education between private and public sectors. This concern
is related to the debate on the possible existence of non productive rents received by workers
who manage to obtain jobs in the governmental sector in developing countries where competitive
pressures are weak (e.g. Terrell, 1996; Lienert and Modi, 1997). One could augment equation
(1) with a dummy variable indicating the sector (assuming that the main e®ect is through the
constant term) or estimate separate regression for each sector (assuming di®erent constant and
slopes). However, such an approach would lead to biased estimates since sector choice is likely to
be endogenous (e.g. der Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988).
To correct for potential bias resulting from self-selection between private and public sectors, the
Heckman approach is extended to the case where after deciding to enter the wage sector, workers
decide whether to work in the private or the public sector7. Consider that conditional on entering
the wage sector, there are both observed and unobserved factors that determine whether a worker
joins the private or the public sector. As with the participation equation, the relationship between
the outcome (the observed employment sector) and the determining factors can be expressed in a
reduced form as a probabilistic model.
si = °1xi + °2z2i + ºi (3)
6Employer in the survey is de¯ned as an individual, excluding farmers, who hires workers (excluding house workers)
for a wage. Note also that this category is excluded from the analysis.
7See Tunali (1986) for a comprehensive exposition of the method used, and Stillman (2000) for a more recent
application.10
where s = 0;1 for the public and the private sectors, respectively, and z2 is a set of exogenous
variables, which must be distinct from z1 in order to identify (2) from (3). I exploit the proposi-
tion that the reservation wage as measured in section| determine the decision to enter the wage
sector, but does not a®ect how worker choose between the private and the public sector. These
two instruments are then excluded from private-public sector choice regression (3). Thus, z2 in
regression (3) contains only the ratio of employers to work force in the community and its squared
term. With these identifying assumptions, one can use a sector speci¯c wage de¯ned as:
lnwis = ¯1stxis + "is
along with equation (2), and equation (3), to write a full reduced form system of equations allowing
for both selection into the wage sector and by sector.
yi = ®1 + ®2xi + ®3z1i + ¹i (4a)
si = °1xi + °2z2i + ºi (4b)
lnwi0 = ¯10xi0 + "i0 (4c)
lnwi1 = ¯11xi1 + "i1 (4d)
In this model si is observed if yi = 1, the wage in the private sector is observed if yi = 1 and
si = 1, and the wage in the public sector is observed if yi = 1 and si = 0.
Identi¯cation of (4) requires that ¹i and ºi follow a bivariate normal distribution, although
no additional restrictions are needed on the other error terms8. The model is estimated using a
two-step procedure. The ¯rst step is a binary response model with sample selection, which jointly
estimates (4a) and (4b) using maximum likelihood and controlling for the selected nature of the
sample (See Wooldridge, 2002, p.570-571). From the ¯rst stage, two Mills ratios are calculated for
the participation in the wage sector, and for the choice of private sector, respectively. The second
8Note that the covariance ("i0;"i1) cannot be identi¯ed since no individual is observed working simultaneously in
the two sectors.11
step estimates the sector-speci¯c earning functions (4c) and (4d) using OLS and including the Mills
ratios as regressors. As with Heckman's approach, the parameters are unbiased, but the variances
must be adjusted for statistical inferences to be valid9.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Probit estimation of the selection into the wage sector
Estimations of the participation equation using a probit speci¯cation are presented in table 4 for
women (column 1) and men (column 2). The instruments used have the expected sign, and although
only the real estate ownership is signi¯cant in women sub-sample, the null hypothesis of the joint
non signi¯cance of the instruments is rejected at any reasonable level: the computed Â2 is 77.2 and
489.7 for the women and the men sub-samples, respectively, with degree of freedom of ¯ve.
|Insert table 4 about here|-
The probability of wage employment increases with experience at a decreasing rate for both
men and women. The probability of being in the wage sector is maximized at age 26 for women,
and at age 30 for men. As expected, more years of education are associated with higher probability
of entering the wage sector.
Living in the rural areas has a strong negative e®ect on the probability of being in the wage
sector. This is consistent in the context of Burkina, where the wage sector is concentrated in two
major cities10. The coe±cients of the year and rural dummies indicate that for men, the probability
of entering the wage sector has increased between 1994 and 1998, while it has decreased in rural
areas. This result is consistent with the descriptive statistics contained in table 3. For women, the
probability of entering wage sector has decreased in the urban areas between 1994 and 1998, while
it has remained stable in the rural areas.
9In practice, the bootstrap techniques are used to avoid the di±culties associated with the analytical derivations.
10Ouagadougou, the capital city and Bobo-Dioulasso, the second largest city.12
4.2 Estimated wage equations
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the wage earners sub-sample and maximum likelihood
estimates (MLE) of the sample selection model are presented in table 5. The OLS estimates are
presented in columns (1) to (3) for the whole sample, women and men, and the MLE estimates are
presented in columns (4) and (5) for women and men.
|Insert table 5 about here|-
To begin, the OLS estimates of years of education and post schooling experience are signi¯cant
at the one percent level, and the model explains more than 50 percent of the variations in monthly
wages, indicating that the Mincerian speci¯cation provides a good ¯t for the data. The results
are consistent with most of the previous OLS estimates of the Mincer equation in other developing
country samples (e.g. Kugler and Psacharopoulos, 1989; Mwabu and Schultz, 2000; Siphambe,
2000). However, an examination of the coe±cients of the Mills ratio in columns (4) and (5)
(all signi¯cant at the one percent level) indicate that entry in the wage sector introduces sample
selection. Thus, the OLS estimates are biased and the MLE estimates are preferred. Consequently,
the discussion focuses on the MLE estimates, and I will turn later to the potential bias of the OLS
estimates.
From columns (4) and (5), the implied rate of return to education at the primary education
level is 9 percent for both men and women. At the secondary and tertiary levels, the returns are
14.3 and 13.2 percent for men, and 16.4 and 9.8 percent for women, respectively11. Thus, men in
the wage sector are better compensated than women for an additional year of primary and tertiary
education, while women are better compensated at the secondary education level.
The OLS estimates imply rates of return to education of 9.9 percent for the primary education,
16.4 percent for the secondary education and 11.4 percent for the tertiary education. The implied
rates of returns are higher for women than for men at the primary and secondary education levels;
12.3 and 11.5 percent for women, as compared to 9.8 and 15.3 for men (columns 2 and 3). Thus,
compared to the more consistent MLE estimates, the OLS estimates are upward biased for primary
and secondary education, and downward biased for tertiary education, and di®erentially in favor
11The implied rate of return at the tertiary level is: [exp(¯) ¡ 1]=2.13
of women.
Turning to the other covariates, the linear and quadratic terms of the post schooling experience
are statistically signi¯cant, with positive and negative signs as expected. The estimates indicate that
wages peak at 42 and at 33 years of experience for men and women, respectively. After controlling
for sample selection, living in rural area has a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on women's wage,
while the e®ect on men wage is positive but not signi¯cant. This may be re°ecting compensation
that workers receive (especially in the public sector) receive for relocating to rural areas. The
year-dummy coe±cient suggests that average men wage increased between 1994 and 1998, while
for women the wage decreased. This suggests that the adjustment process may have di®erentiated
gender e®ects in the wage sector.
4.3 Returns to education in public and private sectors
Single estimation results using the full reduced form (4) are presented in table 6. The regression
results are presented by gender for each sector. The point estimates of returns to education are
signi¯cant at the 5 percent level across the six regressions, except for primary education in the
public sector12. After controlling the sector choice, the Mills ratio for the participation in the labor
market is insigni¯cant except for a negative e®ect for women in the private sector.
|Insert table 6 about here|-
Consistent with the results presented in previous subsections, returns to education rise as educa-
tion level increases. For men, an additional year of primary education is estimated to increase wage
by 8.8 percent and 9.0 percent in the public and in the private sectors, respectively. Compensation
for secondary education is 14.1 percent in the public sector and 11.2 in the private sector. Higher
education is better compensated by the private sector, 27.2 percent as compared to 8.4 percent in
the public sector. For women, the rate of returns at the primary education level are .3 percent in
the public sector and 3.4 percent in the private sector, but statistically not di®erent from zero. The
returns to secondary education are 10 percent in the public sector and 14.2 percent in the private
sector, while the corresponding ¯gures for higher education are 10.6 percent and 8 percent.
12Statistical inference obtained from bootstrap, which consisted of 500 replications.14
The wage rate was increasing in the private sector and in the cities for men. For women wage
gains were only signi¯cant in the public sector. Thus, it appears that the improvement in the
private sector may be bene¯ting more to men than to women. Moreover, the bene¯ts seem to have
been concentrated in urban areas.
Disaggregating across sectors generates two results. First, return to primary education is al-
most zero for women. Thus, whenever expected schooling is less than secondary education, the
implied expected rate of return may discourage female enrollment. Second, the private and the
public sectors have di®erent compensation systems for men and women. Women with primary and
secondary education are relatively better compensated by the private sector than by the public
sector, while the public sector compensates more women with higher education. For men, primary
and higher educations are better compensated by the private sector, while the public sector com-
pensates better secondary education. Overall, compared to the private sector, the public sector is
paying workers with secondary education more than the private sector, and compensating those
with higher education less. To some extent, this re°ects long term policy goal in Burkina, which
sought to limit wage gap among public servants (Zagre, 1994).
4.4 Robustness check
Joint normality of the error terms and correct speci¯cation are both critical for the MLE estimates
in table 5 and the estimates in table 6 to be consistent (e.g. Ahn and Powell, 1993; Das, Newey,
and Vella, 2003). Alternatively, semi-parametric version of the sample selection model can be
used to obtain estimates, which are robust to violation of the joint normality assumption and to
miss-speci¯cation of the selection process (e.g. Ahn and Powell, 1993; Das, Newey, and Vella, 2003;
Schafgans, 1998, 2000). In particular, one might use a non-parametric speci¯cation for the selection
probability and allow the selection term to enter the wage equation non-parametrically (Das, Newey,
and Vella, 2003).
In this section, I re-estimate the selection probability using the non-parametric estimation
method developed in Racine and Li (2003), which admits both discrete and continuous covariates.
More formally, the probability of being selected in the wage sector conditional on the variables x15
and z described above (E [participjx;z1]) is estimated free of distributional and functional form
assumptions. Racine and Li (2003) show that the proposed estimator has rate of convergence which
depends only on the number of continuous variables involved, and it accommodates the interactions
among discrete and continuous variables.
With the estimated probability of participation, a selection term can be constructed as ¼1 =
Pr[particip = 1]¡1, which is used in the second step to correct the selection bias (Robinson, 1989).
The framework is extended to the choice between private and public sectors. The probability of
being selected in the private sector conditional on the variables x, z2, and ¼1 is estimated non-
parametrically using the same methods discussed above. The selection terms are then constructed
as ¼2 = Pr[private = 1]¡1 for private sector workers and ¼2 = Pr[private = 0]¡1 for public sector
workers.
In estimating the earning functions, the selection terms are allowed to enter the wage regression
non-parametrically. More formally, the wage equation for the selected sample is estimated as
follows:
lnwi = ¯1xi + g(¼1i) + "i (5)
Where the variables xi have been described before, and g is an unknown function, which is
assumed to be smooth in ¼1
13. Consistently estimating ¯ requires that the contaminating e®ects
of g(:) be removed ¯rst. Following Ahn and Powell (1993) and Yatchew (1999), I use di®erencing
method to remove the non-parametric e®ects. In other words the data are rearranged in ascending
order using ¼1, and then di®erentiated to get14:
¢lnwi = ¢g(¼1i) + ¯¢xi + ¢"i (6)
Under the assumptions about g (in particular that ¼1 which are close will have corresponding val-
ues of g which are close), the ¯rst term at the RHS vanishes as n goes to in¯nity (plim[g(¼1i) ¡ g(¼1i¡1)] =
0), so that the parameters ¯ can be consistently estimated by applying OLS on the following re-
13Note that the constant is subsumed in the function g.
14Alternatively one could use Robinson (1988)'estimator.16
gression.
¢lnwi = ¯¢xi + ¢"i (7)
Following Yatchew (1999) higher di®erencing allows e±ciency gains. Accordingly, I use third
order di®erences with optimal weights given in Yatchew (1999, p.19).
Semi-parametric estimations of the wage equations, are reported in table 7. The estimates in
columns (1) and (4) are comparable to the MLE estimates in table 5 and the results reported in
columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) are comparable should be compared to those in table 6.
The results in columns (1) and (4) ignore the choice between private and public sectors. The es-
timated rates of returns for men are 10.5 percent for primary education, 14.8 percent for secondary
education, and 12.8 percent for tertiary education. These are comparable to MLE estimates15.
Using semi-parametric methods, estimated rates of returns to female primary and secondary ed-
ucation are 17.4 and 20.1 percent, and are substantially higher than that implied by MLE; 9.3
percent and to 9.1 percent, respectively.
|{Insert table 7 about here|||
Estimations which account for sector choice are presented columns (2) and (3) for women, and
in columns (5) and (6) for men. For women, returns to primary and secondary education are higher
in the private sector than in the public sector, contrasting with the parametric estimates, where
returns to primary education are insigni¯cant in both sectors and returns to secondary education
are higher in the public sector. Post secondary education generates signi¯cant returns only in the
public sector. For men, returns to education are found to be higher in the private sector across all
segments of education, while the returns to secondary education were found higher in the public
sector with the parametric methods. Other than that the parametric and the semi-parametric
methods lead to similar qualitative conclusions.
Overall, most of the qualitative conclusions using the parametric methods are preserved for
men. For women, the noticeable change is the positive and signi¯cant returns to primary education
15For men, the implied rates of returns by MLE method are 9.3 percent for primary education, 14.3 for secondary
education, and 13.1 percent for tertiary education.17
in the private sector. Moreover, in terms of magnitude, the parameters are more stable across
estimation methods for men than for women. This suggests that violation of the joint normality
assumption, or miss-characterization of the sample selection process is more likely to a®ect more
women results than the men results. However, this conclusion must be interpreted with caution
because of the small size of the female sample16.
To provide further insights in the di®erences in returns to education between men and women,
the predicted log wage is presented in ¯gure 2. The earning functions have been ¯tted using
partial linear regressions 17. The speci¯cation maintains a quadratic relationship between log wage
and post-schooling experience but does not impose any functional form between log wage and
education. Formally, the relationship may be expressed as lnwi = g(edi) + ¯xi + ²i, where ed is
years of education, x is a set of variables containing post schooling experience and the inverse mills
ratios. In other words, the method partials out the e®ects of the other covariates and then use
non-parametric method to ¯t the relationship °exibly between log wage and education.
||-insert ¯gure 2 about here |||-
The ¯gure indicates that the relationship between log wage and education is not constant nor
linear. From ¯gure(2), a minimum of four years of education are needed for women before any
positive e®ect on wage is apparent. After this critical level, there is a downturn between ¯ve and
seven years, but the wage premium is thereafter increasing with education. In contrast to women,
there is no apparent critical education level for men. It is informative to note that the four years of
education are far above the expected years of education for women which correspond to .55 year.
Thus, policy seeking to increase girl enrollment should be designed so that most girls stay in school
at least for four years.
16Note that Schafgans (2000, 1998) reaches to similar conclusions in Malaysia with relatively larger female sample.
He found that semi-parametric estimates of the wage equation di®ered from MLE estimates for women but not for
men. The sample he used, included more than 1200 women with positive wage. Thus, his conclusions are less subject
to small sample size bias.
17Because of the limited size of the women sample, separated sector-speci¯c regressions are not estimated.18
5 conclusions
The aim of this paper was to explore whether private returns to education could explain the observed
trends in school enrollment over the past decades, which have been very low. To examine this
question, two nationally representative surveys were used to estimate wage equations with sample
selection corrected at two levels, the participation in the wage sector, and the choice between private
and public sectors.
Rates of returns to education are found to di®er substantially between men and women, and be-
tween the private and public sectors. Speci¯cally, rate of returns to primary education in the public
sector were found to be very small for men and almost zero for women. Moreover, the graphical
analysis suggests that earning pro¯les are non-convex in education, and the non-convexities appear
to be more pronounced for women than men. The ¯ndings are informative for education policy
purpose. The relatively high returns to secondary and tertiary education would provide parents
with enough incentives to enroll their children at secondary and at tertiary level. Hence, primary
education is only useful as long as the child is able to complete at least secondary school. As a
consequence, parents will enroll their children if opportunity and direct schooling costs up to the
completion of at least secondary school are a®ordable. Particularly girls are unlikely to be enrolled
unless parents expect them to stay in school for at least four years, which corresponds to about
seven times the average women years of education.
In combination with the imperfections in credit markets, these non-convexities imply reduced
incentives for low-income households to invest in education since the prospects for crossing the
minimal education level are limited. This might limit social mobility over time since education
level depends to a great extent on initial conditions. This suggests that education policies which
focus on increasing the supply of primary education should be complemented with policies which
improve employment prospects for primary school graduates. From this perspective, an encouraging
note is the expansion of the private sector, which is found in this study to generate relatively higher
returns to both male and female primary education.19
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimations
Mean St. dev Min Max
Female wage earners (n=620)
Log wage 10.59 1.06 7.82 13.65
Post sch. exp. 17.04 8.97 0.00 56.00
Years of education 8.86 4.59 0.00 15.00
Primary 5.07 2.09 0.00 6.00
Secondary 3.55 2.75 0.00 7.00
Tertiary 0.24 0.65 0.00 2.00
Rural dummy 0.09 0.28 0.00 1.00
Year dummy (1998) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Year-rural dummy 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Real estate 0.28 0.26 0.00 1.00
Fam. bus. age 0.38 2.31 0.00 25.00
Labor demand in private sector 21.44 14.83 0.00 36.00
Male wage earners (2922)
Log wage 10.68 0.89 7.82 13.86
Post sch. exp. 20.88 10.39 0.00 58.00
Years of education 4.05 2.69 0.00 6.00
Primary 2.50 2.89 0.00 7.00
Secondary 0.21 0.61 0.00 2.00
Tertiary 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Rural dummy 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Year dummy (1998) 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Year-rural dummy 0.71 0.64 0.00 4.00
Real estate 0.31 0.22 0.00 1.00
Fam. bus. age 0.06 0.57 0.00 15.21
Labor demand in private sector 20.80 15.14 0.00 36.00
Working age women (n=26762)
Post sch. exp. 25.24 13.32 0.00 58.00
Years of education 0.54 2.04 0.00 15.00
Primary 0.42 1.45 0.00 6.00
Secondary 0.11 0.76 0.00 7.00
Tertiary 0.01 0.11 0.00 2.00
Rural dummy 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
Year dummy (1998) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Year-rural dummy 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Real estate 0.51 0.33 0.00 1.00
Fam. bus. age 0.79 3.85 0.00 60.00
Labor demand in private sector 2.88 8.53 0.00 36.00
Working age men (n=28764)
Post sch. exp. 24.58 14.09 0.00 58.00
Years of education 1.40 3.21 0.00 15.00
Primary 1.04 2.15 0.00 6.00
Secondary 0.33 1.32 0.00 7.00
Tertiary 0.02 0.22 0.00 2.00
Rural dummy 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Year dummy (1998) 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Year-rural dummy 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Real estate 0.68 0.40 0.00 1.00
Fam. bus. age 0.86 4.01 0.00 58.00
Labor demand in private sector 4.75 10.89 0.00 36.0023
Table 2: Workers distribution across education levels
All persons Private Public
15-65 wage wage
Males
No schooling 79.56 41.31 15.17
Any primary 13.18 27.56 17.81
Any secondary 6.03 25.38 51.57
Any tertiary 1.22 5.75 15.46
Total 100 (28546) 100 (1513) 100 (1404)
Row total 100.00 51.87 48.13
Females
No schooling 91.76 24.73 2.71
Any primary 5.53 24.37 9.04
Any secondary 2.40 41.22 74.40
Any tertiary 0.32 9.68 13.86
Total 100 (26533) 100 (279) 100 (332)
Row total 100.00 45.66 54.3424
Table 3: Workers allocation between private and public sectors
Urban Rural Pooled
Employment status Men Women Men Women sample
1994
Wage earners, from whom 36.64 13.22 1.74 0.27 6.37
Public sector 49.63 56.30 71.73 75.90 53.64
Private sector 50.37 43.70 28.27 24.10 46.38
Self employed 63.36 86.78 98.26 99.73 93.63
N. obs 3314 2043 11077 10272 26706
1998
Wage earners, from whom 42.41 14.66 1.67 0.27 6.38
Public sector 40.09 49.66 78.57 61.54 45.16
Private sector 59.91 50.34 21.43 38.46 54.84
Self employed 57.59 85.34 98.33 99.73 93.62
N. obs 3243 2019 11130 12428 2882025
Table 4: Participation in wage market
(2) (3)
Women Men
Post schooling experience 0.0365 0.09001
[3.77]*** [17.11]***
psexp squared -0.0706 -0.145
[3.77]*** [15.53]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 0.169 0.127
[12.44]*** [18.09]***
Secondary schooling, 1-7 0.352 0.282
[18.16]*** [25.94]***
Post secondary, 2 0.199 0.244
[1.93]* [4.49]***
Rural dummy, rural =1 -0.992 -1.244
[8.59]*** [23.18]***
Year dummy, 1994=1 -0.0152 -0.275
[0.19] [6.17]***
Year rural 0.139 0.288
[0.97] [4.26]***
Identifying instruments
Real estate -0.409 -0.447
[6.13]*** [12.98]***
labor demand in private sector 0.0158 0.01803
[1.11] [2.34]**
labor d. squared -0.00629 0.0115
[0.15] [0.52]
Family business -0.0163 -0.0311
[0.61] [2.82]***
Family b. squared -0.0137 0.0649
[0.10] [1.82]*
Constant -2.261 -1.967
[14.90]*** [23.11]***
Observations 26766 28789
Instruments (Â
2(5)) 77.23 489.66
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%26
Table 5: Estimated wage equations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS MLE
Pooled sample Women Men Women Men
Post schooling experience 0.0990 0.1175 0.0954 0.1122 0.0919
[25.19]*** [11.76]*** [22.21]*** [11.13]*** [19.36]***
psexp squared -0.1277 -0.1895 -0.1188 -0.1781 -0.1126
[15.85]*** [8.22]*** [13.81]*** [7.71]*** [12.09]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 0.0992 0.1231 0.0982 0.0932 0.0921
[17.86]*** [7.54]*** [16.85]*** [4.80]*** [13.56]***
Secondary schooling, 1-7 0.1645 0.2066 0.1529 0.1638 0.1429
[28.64]*** [15.00]*** [24.30]*** [7.95]*** [16.80]***
Post secondary, 2 0.2061 0.1566 0.2254 0.1808 0.2339
[9.85]*** [3.25]*** [9.79]*** [3.65]*** [9.93]***
Rural dummy, rural =1 -0.0086 0.1783 -0.0345 0.3408 0.0320
[0.18] [1.27] [0.67] [2.25]** [0.50]
Year dummy, 1994=1 -0.0292 0.0078 -0.0458 0.0102 -0.0439
[1.26] [0.13] [1.83]* [0.18] [1.76]*
Yeard-rural 0.0377 0.1893 0.0358 0.1836 0.0397
[0.56] [0.98] [0.50] [0.96] [0.56]
Male 0.2059
[7.11]***
¸ -0.3736 -0.4586
[11.00]*** [33.57]***
Constant 8.2685 7.8853 8.5416 8.4041 8.6802
[142.49]*** [62.24]*** [146.02]*** [37.49]*** [88.40]***
Observations 3571 624 2947 26766 28789
R-squared 0.52 0.6 0.51
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%27
Table 6: Estimated wage equations with endogenous sector choice
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Public Sector Private Sector Public Sector Private Sector
Post schooling experience 0.0592 0.112 0.0859 0.0805
[4.26]*** [5.38]*** [14.39]*** [8.51]***
Post sch. exp. squared -0.0720 -0.171 -0.108 -0.105
[2.12]** [4.25]*** [9.22]*** [6.78]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 0.00327 0.0336 0.0883 0.0902
[0.09] [0.85] [7.94]*** [7.85]***
Secondary schooling, 1-7 0.100 0.142 0.141 0.112
[2.94]*** [2.56]** [11.50]*** [6.80]***
Post secondary, 2 0.193 0.148 0.159 0.445
[4.49]*** [1.47] [7.39]*** [9.63]***
Rural dummy, rural =1 -0.176 1.133 -0.000488 -0.599
[1.11] [3.51]*** [0.00] [3.37]***
Year dummy, 1994=1 -0.0995 0.0848 0.0247 -0.186
[1.82]* [0.81] [0.76] [4.39]***
Yeard-rural 0.139 -0.064 -0.079 0.356
[0.92] [0.16] [1.24] [2.44]**
Mills wage sector -0.111 -0.643 0.060 -0.015
[0.77] [2.99]*** [0.75] [0.16]
Mills sector -0.216 -0.131 -0.106 0.148
[1.36] [0.48] [1.19] [1.14]
Constant 9.801 9.025 8.771 8.673
[19.57]*** [15.70]*** [50.25]*** [45.97]***
Observations 337 283 1407 1515
R-squared 0.48 0.66 0.48 0.45
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%28
Table 7: Estimated wage equations: Semi-parametric methods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Women Men
Both sect. Private Public Both sect. Private Public
Post sch. exp. 0.112 0.126 0.051 0.096 0.088 0.078
[11.29]*** [8.51]*** [4.19]*** [21.98]*** [13.96]*** [15.62]***
Post sch. exp. Squared -0.184 -0.206 -0.053 -0.121 -0.115 -0.100
[8.20]*** [6.65]*** [1.62] [13.84]*** [9.61]*** [9.51]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 0.174 0.144 -0.003 0.105 0.097 0.060
[9.29]*** [6.02]*** [0.12] [16.19]*** [11.36]*** [7.86]***
Secondary schooling, 1-7 0.201 0.248 0.106 0.148 0.130 0.113
[12.98]*** [9.64]*** [7.58]*** [23.38]*** [12.05]*** [16.55]***
Post secondary, 2 0.167 0.085 0.199 0.229 0.436 0.191
[3.54]*** [0.88] [5.26]*** [10.09]*** [9.59]*** [9.66]***
Rural -0.008 0.224 -0.251 -0.068 -0.556 -0.023
[0.06] [0.83] [2.15]** [1.21] [4.69]*** [0.49]
Year 1994 -0.016 0.061 -0.131 -0.033 -0.162 0.001
[0.28] [0.63] [2.59]** [1.31] [4.44]*** [0.03]
Rural*1994 0.138 0.127 0.117 0.069 0.382 -0.031
[0.74] [0.34] [0.77] [0.96] [2.60]*** [0.51]
Constant 0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
[0.08] [0.21] [0.08] [0.04] [0.02] [0.17]
Observations 615 278 332 2917 1510 1402
Absolute value of t statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%29
Figure 1: Empirical Wage Density and Distribution Functions (Unconditional)
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Figure 2: Wage increments
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Table 8: Determinants of sector choice
(1) (2)
Women Men
Post schooling experience -0.0991 -0.0662
[3.20]*** [6.35]***
Post. sch. sxp. squared 0.162 0.0695
[2.24]** [3.75]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 -0.118 -0.0139
[1.22] [0.92]
Secondary schooling, 1-7 -0.132 -0.101
[1.22] [5.44]***
Post secondary, 2 0.150 0.00816
[1.34] [0.16]
Rural dummy, rural =1 -0.254 -1.194
[0.58] [9.79]***
Year dummy, 1994=1 -0.207 -0.397
[1.45] [6.19]***
Year/Rural -0.461 0.354
[1.13] [2.42]**
labor demand in private sector 0.0979 0.0342
[3.55]*** [3.05]***
labor d. squared -0.239 -0.0535
[3.05]*** [1.69]*
Constant 1.406 0.684
[1.02] [2.99]***
Participation equation
Post schooling experience 0.0340 0.0951
[3.50]*** [18.40]***
Post. sch. exp. squared -0.0688 -0.154
[3.66]*** [16.69]***
Primary schooling, 1-6 0.173 0.129
[12.81]*** [18.71]***
Secondary schooling, 1-7 0.342 0.286
[17.63]*** [26.65]***
Post secondary, 2 0.167 0.191
[1.59] [3.57]***
Rural dummy, rural =1 -1.152 -1.601
[10.95]*** [33.87]***
Year dummy, 1994=1 0.109 -0.0792
[1.63] [2.23]**
Year/Rural 0.003 0.112
[0.02] [1.76]*
Real estate -0.845 -0.525
[7.48]*** [10.58]***
Family bus. age -0.0335 -0.0320
[1.40] [3.01]***
Family bus. Age squared 0.0223 0.0649
[0.22] [1.86]*
Constant -2.040 -1.713
[14.45]*** [22.09]***
½ 0.340 0.919
[0.68] [7.47]***
Observations 26762 28764
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%